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of	 German	 power	 influence	 the	 vision	 of	 the	 international	
order	that	the	country	favours.	Due	to	its	central geographic	
location	in	the	‘European	area	of	stability’,	a	direct	territorial	
threat	 to	Germany	 involving	military	means	 is	perceived	 to	





ited,	 the	German	 strategic	 culture	makes	 the	 country	 scep-
tical	 about	 the	use	of	military	 instruments,	 and	Berlin	does	
not	 possess	 nuclear	weapons.	 Economically,	Germany	 is	 the	
world’s	 third	 largest	 power	 with	 export-oriented	 economic	
model	 that	 increasingly	 influences	 the	choice	of	 its	strategic	
priorities.	Berlin,	which	over	 the	 last	 ten	years	has	been	 fo-
cused	on	economic	expansion	within	the	enlarged	EU,	is	now	
gradually	 becoming	 a	 country	with	 global	 trade	 and	 invest-







ment	and	growing	 international	 ambitions	 to	prompt	global	





















and	 bilateral	 co-operation	 in	 specific	 sectors,	 as	well	 as	 co-
operation	with	regional	and	international	organisations,	with	
minimum	military	involvement	on	its	own	part.	
•	 Germany’s	 policy	may	 increasingly	pose	 a	 risk	 to	maintain-
ing	the	cohesion	of	NATO	in	the	global	dimension.	On	the	one	
hand,	Germany	faces	the	temptation	to	put	political	and	eco-
nomic	 relations	 with	 the	 emerging	 powers	 above	 relations	




as	 China)	 and	 the	 ‘old’	 allies	 (the	USA).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
Germany’s	 aversion	 to	using	military	 instruments	 leaves	 its	




































ern	 regions).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 German	 government	





•	 Germany’s	 policy	 of	 de-escalation	 in	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	







considers	 Berlin	 to	 be	 a	 partner	who	 –	 facing	Russian	mili-
tary	pressure	–	might	be	inclined	to	negotiate	a	change	to	the	
European	security	architecture	at	 the	expense	of	 the	 sover-

















































i. the determinants  
of German security policy
(1) Germany’s central location in the ‘european area of sta-
bility’ (i.e.	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 European	 part	 of	 NATO)	 defines 
the German perception of the risks and threats facing the 
country.	 The	 enlargement	 of	NATO	 and	 the	 EU	 that	 included	
Germany’s	 eastern	neighbours	made	 the	Germans	 feel	 secure.	
a direct territorial threat to Germany involving military 




flict	 in	2014.	thus, Germany has focused on indirect trans-
border risks and threats stemming from globalisation, such	




than	countries	 like	France,	 Italy	or	Great	Britain.	This is	most	




of	 post-colonial	 links	 to	Africa	 or	 the	Middle	East	 are	 the	 two	
factors	 that	diminish	 the	 influx	of	 illegal	migrants	 from	areas	
affected	 by	 crises	 and	 conflicts.	 The	 Islamic	 State’s	 (ISIL/ISIS)	























(2) historical, social and internal factors that	shape	the	pref-
erences	of	 the	political	 elite	 and	 the	public	 and	define	 the	 stra-
tegic	 culture	determine Germany’s choice of security policy 
instruments.	 Because	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 Nazism	 and	World	
War	II	and	the	political	tradition	of	West	Germany	defining	itself	
as	a	‘civilian	power’,	it is	difficult for the German government 
to win	 the	 public’s support for the use of the Bundeswehr 
abroad.	Moreover,	it	is	a	widely	held	view	among	German	deci-
sion-makers	that	strengthening the Bundeswehr and stepping 
up Germany’s foreign military engagement, combined with 
the country’s economic prowess, could lead to an overwhelm-
ing imbalance of power in europe.	That,	in	turn,	could	re-ignite	





kel’s	 rule	 (the	CDU/CSU-SPD	coalitions	 in	 the	years	 2005–2009,	
CDU/CSU-FDP	 in	 the	 years	 2009–2013	 and	 CDU/CSU-SPD	 since	
2013).	 The	 decisions	 concerning	German	military	 (non-)engage-
ment	abroad	are	 thus	partly	a	product	of	 the	country’s	 internal	
politics,	especially	during	the	periods	of	federal	or	state	elections.	
In	 order	 to	 prevent	 situations	 in	 which	 sensitive	 issues	 would	
be	exploited	in	the	political	struggle	at	the	federal	or	state	level,	
the	coalition governments have taken care to obtain broad 






















inter-party agreement and the public support on security 
and defence policy questions, and have avoided controversial 
decisions.
finally, historical and social factors also play a role in the 
way Germany shapes its foreign and security policy with 








On	top	of	 that,	 there	 is	 the	conviction	that	the	policy	of	détente	





(3) the German economic model has a great impact on the 
strategic priorities of Germany’s foreign and security policy. 
The	country’s	highly	industrialised	economy	is	characterised	by	
a	 strong	 orientation towards exports (mainly	 of	 investment	
goods,	which	accounted	for	44.1%	of	total	exports	in	2013)4	and	is 
heavily dependent on imports of natural resources (energy	
resources	and	metals).
























tion.6	However,	the dynamics of Germany’s foreign trade with 
the emerging powers (in recent years mainly china)	is much 
higher than with the Western partners.	 Germany	 perceives	
not	only	the	BRICS	countries	as	increasingly	important	economic	
and	political	partners.	This	 applies	 also	 to	 regional	players	 like	
Vietnam,	 Mexico,	 Malaysia,	 Indonesia,	 Columbia,	 Nigeria	 and	
Angola.7 Germany, which over the last ten years has been fo-
cused on economic expansion within the enlarged eu, is now 
gradually becoming a country with global trade and invest-
ment links.	
Germany imports between 70% and 98% of the energy re-
sources and nearly 100% of the metals it consumes.	the coun-
try relies increasingly on global interdependencies to import 





5	 16%	 of	 exports	 are	 destined	 for	 Asian	 countries,	 and	 12%	 to	 countries	 of	
North	and	South	America.
6	 The	top	three	are	France,	the	USA	and	Great	Britain.	Statistisches	Bundes-































or	 11th	 largest	 trading	 partner	 (interchangeably	 with	 Poland).9	
Moreover,	 as	 German	 companies	 switch	 to	 non-European	mar-
kets,	the	relative importance of the russian market for Ger-
man exports is decreasing	(despite	the	rise	in	German	exports	
to	and	investments	in	Russia	in	recent	years).	Russia	is	the	larg-





als	partnerships’,	the	importance of russia as a supplier of re-
sources to Germany will decrease in the long term.	
(4) the political, economic and military parameters of Ger-
man power influence the vision of the international order 
8	 Within	 the	 framework	 of	 those	 partnerships,	 Germany	 seeks	 access	 to	
deposits	 of	 raw	 materials	 in	 return	 for	 investments,	 technology	 trans-
fers	or	development	 aid.	To	date,	 such	partnerships	have	been	 concluded	
with	Kazakhstan,	Mongolia,	Chile	and	Peru,	while	Russia	and	China	still	
remain	 important	partners	 for	Germany.	Konrad	Popławski,	 ‘Germany	 is	
consistently	implementing	its	strategy	of	raw	material	partnerships’,	OSW 
Analyses,	 6	 February	 2013,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2013-02-06/germany-consistently-implementing-its-strategy-raw-ma-
terial.	See	also	Anna	Kwiatkowska-Drożdż,	‘The	natural	resources	deficit:	






billion	worth	of	goods	 to	 the	V4	and	€36	billion	worth	of	goods	 to	Russia.	
For	imports,	the	proportions	are	as	follows:	Germany	imported	around	€100	
billion	worth	of	goods	from	the	V4	and	around	€40	billion	worth	of	goods	
















that the country favours.	 Politically,	 Germany	 is	 a	 regional	
power	 in	 the	 EU	 with	 considerable	 diplomatic	 potential.	 Eco-
nomically	it	is	the	world’s	third	largest	power.	At	the	same	time,	
Germany’s	military	potential	is	limited,	and	the	country	does	not	
possess	nuclear	weapons.	Therefore, Berlin is essentially inter-
ested in maintaining peace and stability, both in europe and 
globally, and in developing diplomatic mechanisms to man-





As	a	result,	Germany’s	attitude towards the united states has 
been increasingly ambivalent.	The	USA	 is	 still	 an	ally	within	
NATO,	with	whom	Germany	maintains	military	links,	and	an	im-
portant	 political	 and	 economic	 partner.	However	 in the global 
context, the USA’s	ambition	to	keep	its	dominant	position	in	the	
international	 order,	 its	 propensity	 to	 act	 unilaterally	 and	 bend	
international	law,	and	its	ambition	to	contain	potential	rivals,	is	
seen	in	Germany	as	potentially	threatening	to	German	interests.	






































reporting	negative	 attitudes	 towards	 the	US	and	 51%	 reporting	 a	positive	
attitude.	See	Bruce	Stokes,	‘Which	countries	don’t	like	America	and	which	
















ii. the GloBal dimension of Germany’s 
security policy
1.  German concepts for global security 
(1) co-operative security. The	concept	of	co-operative	security,	
based	 on	 co-operation	 and	 dialogue,	was	 present	 in	 Germany’s	
policy	with	regard	to	the	East-West	relations	during	the	Cold	War	
and	afterwards.	In	recent	years,	its	global	dimension	has	gained	
more	 significance.	Germany’s	 interest	 is	 primarily	 in	 strength-
ening	 and	 developing	 co-operation	 with	 the	 emerging	 powers.	
Berlin	 does	 not	 want	 their	 (especially	 the	 BRICS)	 political	 and	
economic	 development	 and	 growing	 international	 ambitions	 to	
prompt	global	crises	or	conflicts	that	could	leave	Germany	facing	
difficult	 choices.	 For	 this	 reason,	co-operative security in the 
global (and regional) dimension remains the area of nato’s 
activity to which Germany is most committed. For	Berlin	this	
is	in	fact more	important	than	NATO’s	other	core	tasks:	collective	
defence	and	crisis	management.	Germany	deems	it	highly	impor-









(2) crisis management the German way	 – vernetzte Sicher-
heit. Germany’s	 attitude	 towards	 the	 management	 of	 regional	
crises	 and	 conflicts	 (e.g.	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 and	Africa)	 results	
from	German	thinking	in	terms	of	co-operative	security.	Berlin 
views any direct military intervention into internal or re-

















and	strategic	culture.	Germany has thus been developing a pol-
icy of networked security, the so-called vernetzte Sicherheit. 






itary	advisors.12	Moreover,	Germany	advocates a more extensive 
use of civilian instruments	in	the	domains	of	diplomacy,	devel-
opment	 co-operation,	 justice	 (training	 of	 police	 officers,	 judges,	
prosecutors),	economic	co-operation,	infrastructure	development	
and	environmental	protection.	This	approach	is	popular	with	the	
German	public,	 as	 demonstrated	by	 the	detailed	public	 opinion	
polls	conducted	in	April	and	May	2014.13	The	survey	showed	that	







































many to become more involved in securing the global flows 
of goods and services and developing a new security policy 
narrative on securing the ‘global commons’.	 Such	 a	 strategy	
should	 rely	on	preventative	 and	 response	 instruments,	 both	 ci-
vilian	and	military.	Since	 the	maritime	domain	 is	 of	particular	
importance	for	Germany16,	experts	have	been	calling	on	Germany	







focused	on	good	governance and	 the rule	of	 law	 in	 the	 relevant	
regions.	Such	opinions	are	likely	to	gain	increasing	influence	on	
German	foreign	and	security	policy.	
there is thus wide agreement in Germany that the navy will 
be used more extensively in the future than it has been so far.	
14	 Bundesverband	der	Deutschen	 Industrie,	Grundsatzpapier.	Sicherheit	 für	




tents/products/aktuell/2013A43_hae.pdf;	 Peter	 Hefele,	 ‘Fragile	 Wertschöp-
fungsketten:	 Zur	 Notwendigkeit	 eines	 deutschen	 maritimen	 Engagements’,	




ed	 for	28.5%	of	German	exports	by	weight	and	 56.9%	of	 exports	by	value.	

















Thus,	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 branches	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr,	 the	
German	Navy	was	least	affected	by	the	spending	cuts	implement-
ed	as	part	of	the	most	recent	Bundeswehr	reform	in	2011.	The	ob-
jective	 of	 the	 Navy’s	 capabilities	 development	 is	 to	 enhance	 its	
readiness,	 armament	 and	 equipment,	 and	 training	 levels,	 with	
a	view	to	preparing	the	forces	to	take	part	in	crisis	management	







2.  Germany’s priorities and the challenges for the allies








litical	 and	 economic	 relations	with	China.	 in the event of an 
escalation of the us-china conflict, Germany would have to 
make a geopolitical choice between supporting its ally, the 
usa, or remaining neutral. if it chose the latter, the deci-
sion could entail the disintegration of nato in the global 
dimension. 
potential scenarios of global crises and conflicts, as well as 
the possible scope and consequences of Germany’s response, 
are being considered and analysed in Berlin;	the	policy	game	
with	 a	 scenario	 of	 a	massive	 Chinese	 cyber-attack	 on	 US	 criti-




























the signing and implementation of the transatlantic trade 
and investment partnership (ttip) will be of key importance 





































tion	of	 the	West,	will	 organise	propaganda	campaigns	 that	will	
primarily	 target	Germany	and	present	 the	balance	of	 costs	 and	
benefits	of	the	TTIP	in	a	negative	light.	
(2) european solidarity in crisis management? Germany’s 
preference	 for	 civilian	 instruments	 in	 dealing	 with	 crises	 and	
conflicts	has	led	to	questions	being	raised	about	Germany’s	soli-
darity	 and	willingness	 to	 participate	 in	 crisis	management,	 es-
pecially	 in	the	EU’s	southern	neighbourhood.	from the french 
and British perspective, Germany has been ‘free-riding’ and	
taking	advantage	of	French	and	British	military	 involvement	 in	
crisis	management	which	enhances	the	security	of	the	entire	EU.	
From	 the	 German	 perspective,	 the	 results	 of	 such	 involvement	
have	 been	 ambiguous,	 and	 the	Bundeswehr	 should	not	 be	 used	
to	 secure	 other	 countries’,	 i.e.	 France	 and	Britain’s,	 interests	 in	
their	former	colonies.	Berlin’s	position	on	Libya	in	2011	was	a	par-
ticularly	striking	example	of	Germany’s	refusal	to	participate	in	
international	 crisis	 management.	 Germany	 (along	 with	 China	
and	 Russia)	 abstained	 from	 voting	 at	 the	 UN	 Security	 Council	
(UNSC)	on	a	British-	and	French-backed	resolution	 to	authorise	




19	 Konrad	Popławski,	 ‘The	SPD	presents	 its	conditions	regarding	the	accept-
ance	 of	 the	TTIP’,	OSW Analyses,	 1	October	 2014,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2014-10-01/spd-presents-its-conditions-regard-
ing-acceptance-ttip;	David	Böcking,	 ‘Freihandelsabkommen:	CDU	rechnet	

















In	the	aftermath	of	the	Libya	crisis,	Germany has thus adopted	
a strategy of minimum military involvement in internation-
al crisis management operations. Officially,	Germany	has	en-
dorsed	operations	with	the	UNSC	mandate	conducted	by	NATO,	
individual	allies	or	regional	organisations. Practically, its actual 
military involvement in such operations has been minimal 
and limited to strategic and tactical airlift, logistics, medical 
support, military training and, more recently, arms deliver-
ies.	Bundeswehr	involvement	in	the	operations	in	Mali,	Somalia,	
the	Central	African	Republic	 and	 Iraq	 offers	 a	 good	 illustration	
of	how	Germany	has	been	implementing	this	strategy	since	2011.	
It	seems	that	future	German	governments	will	stick	to	this	course.	
(3) integration of the european armed forces? Due	to	the	sig-
nificant	differences	in	the	strategic	cultures	and	security	policy	
priorities	 among	 the	 largest	 EU	member	 states,	military inte-
gration in europe involving france, Great Britain and Ger-
many is unlikely to happen. in the long run, this may lead 
to a growing fragmentation of military co-operation in eu-
rope.	 In	 November	 2010,	 France	 and	 Great	 Britain	 decided	 to	
strengthen	 their	 bilateral	military	 co-operation	 by	 signing	 the	
Lancaster	House	Treaty	 for	Defence	and	Security	Co-operation,	
and	in	2014	agreed	to	set	their	further	priorities.20	This	was	the	
result	 of	 growing	 frustration	 at	 the	 absence	 of	 progress	within	




























Great	Britain,	 since	 it	 fears	being	pressured	by	 these	 two	coun-
tries	 to	engage	capabilities	 involved	 in	 joint	projects	 in	military	
operations	abroad.	For	this	reason,	Germany currently prefers 
to pursue integration projects with smaller and medium-
sized countries in its neighbourhood – in the Benelux, the 
nordic-Baltic region or the Visegrad Group, where Germany 
is the stronger partner and can be a leader which defines the 















iii. the reGional dimension of Germany’s 
security policy 
1. German priorities in the Baltic sea region and central 
eastern europe
















sia’s	policy	and	its	broken	promises.	However, it is too early to 
say if Germany’s increasingly critical perception of russia 
will prompt the country to change the guiding principle of 
its policy towards moscow. it remains an open question as to 
21	 The	coalition	agreement	of	CDU,	CSU	and	SPD,	‘Deutschlands	Zukunft	ge-
stalten’,	 16	 December	 2013,	 https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/
dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf	
22	 Speech	by	Michael	Roth,	Secretary	of	State	for	European	Affairs	at	the	Ger-





















whether Germany will be willing to consider the scenario of 
an act of more or less open russian aggression against one of 
nato’s eastern member states.	that would require Germany 
to fundamentally change its security policy, and would ne-
cessitate unpopular political, military and economic deci-
sions (endorsing	 a	 policy	 of	 deterrence,	 strengthening	German	
military	potential,	limiting	the	existing	dependencies	on	Russian	
companies	in	key	sectors	of	the	German	economy).	
(1) a ‘common neighbourhood’ in eastern europe. In	line	with	
the	principle	 that	 ‘security	 in	Europe	 is	only	possible	with	Rus-
sia,	not	against	it’,	until recently Germany viewed the eastern 
european states as a kind of eu-russian ‘common neighbour-
hood’ – without prospects of membership in nato and the 
eu, but able to develop economic co-operation with both the 
european union and russia.	In	recent	years,	Germany	has	unof-
ficially	opposed	the	idea	that	Ukraine	and	the	other	Eastern	Part-
nership	countries	could	join	NATO	or	the	EU.	At	the	same	time,	
it	has	not	 recognised	Russia’s	 exclusive	economic	dominance	 in	
those	countries.	Germany’s	objective	has	been	to	draw	them	part-
ly	into	the	orbit	of	the	EU’s	influence,	so	that	European	standards	
and	 legislation	 could	 contribute	 to	 reducing	 corruption	and	en-






in the course of the russian-ukrainian conflict, it became 
clear that Germany’s priority was to prevent the conflict 
from escalating, and that to this end Berlin was willing to 
23	 Justyna	Gotkowska,	‘Germany	and	the	Eastern	Partnership’,	OSW Commen-
















make compromises under russian pressure, giving up on its 
original vision of the ‘common neighbourhood’.	 It	was	of	ut-
most	 importance	 for	Germany	 to	make	sure	 that	 talks	between	








willing	 to	 accept	modifications	 to	 it.	at the same time, while 
Germany opposed military solutions and arms supplies to 
ukraine, it could not afford not to respond to moscow’s illegal 
actions, which threatened to unravel international treaties 
and the post-war security architecture in europe, because it 
would lose credibility in relations with russia and with the 





Forces	 intervened	 in	 eastern	Ukraine;	 thanks	 to	 pressure	 from	
Chancellor	Angela	Merkel,	the	EU	agreed	a	new	package	of	sanc-
tions	against	Russian	nationals	and	entities	in	September	2014.24


























should	be	avoided as	 it	 could	be	regarded	by	Russia	as	provoca-




sian aggression against ukraine, Germany still considered 
any actions aimed at significantly reinforcing nato’s east-
ern flank to be too provocative and likely to escalate tensions 





be	 incompliant	with	 those	documents.	Germany	also	 advocated	
a	speedy	review	of	additional	NATO	activity	in	the	region.	
on the other hand Germany deemed it necessary – as part of 
a policy of reassurance towards poland and the Baltic states, 
but not as a policy of deterrence towards russia – to slightly 
strengthen the military presence on nato’s eastern flank, 
including its own engagement, according to the provisions 
of the nato-russia documents.	Thus,	in	2014	Germany	partici-
pated	in	NATO’s	increased	activity	in	the	Baltic	states,	Poland	and	




25	 In	 June	 and	 July	 2014,	 a	German	Elbe-class	 replenishment	 ship	 served	 as	
a	 command	 ship	and	flagship	 to	 the	SNMCMG1.	Between	August	 and	De-
cember	 2014,	 a	 German	 Frankenthal-class	 mine	 hunter	 participated	 in	
























2. Germany’s regional security policy – challenges for 
the allies
Germany is a key ally on whom the stability and peace on na-
to’s eastern flank largely depend. an increased German po-
litical and military involvement in the Baltic sea region and 
central eastern europe and a demonstration to russia that 
Berlin is prepared to react strongly, could discourage any ag-
gressive russian action on nato’s eastern flank. however, 
Germany’s current policy poses challenges for nato’s cohe-
sion, the security of the eastern member states and the devel-
opment of regional military co-operation.	




US	 shift	 towards	 the	Asia-Pacific	 region,	 the	 security	problems	
in	other	regions,	and	the	perceived	weakness	of	the	administra-
tion	 of	 President	 Barack	 Obama.	Moscow’s	 moves	 to	 date	 have	
been	aimed	at	keeping	the	former	Soviet	republics	within	Russia’s	
sphere	 of	 political,	 economic	 and	 military	 influence	 –	 through	
a	 consolidation	 within	 the	 Eurasian	 Union,	 and	 the	 Collective	
Security	Treaty	Organisation	(CSTO).	However,	moscow’s long-
term, maximum objective is to change the european security 
architecture and to undermine the us-european alliance and 
the credibility of nato.	Moscow	hopes	that	Germany	will	be	the	
main	actor	in	charge	of	managing	the	crisis	in	Europe	stemming	
from	more	or	less	open	Russian	aggressive	action	against	a	NATO	



















pating this kind of reaction from Germany, russia may feel 
encouraged to test nato’s cohesion and its ability to act in 
the Baltic sea region and in the central eastern europe, and 
try to pursue its strategic objectives.	
Germany’s policy to date, which	has	been	about	de-escalating	the	
conflict	in	Ukraine	on	the	one	hand,	and	limiting	efforts	to	militar-
ily	strengthen	NATO’s	eastern	flank	on	the	other,	combined with 
reports about the Bundeswehr’s problems with armament and 
military equipment, has given rise to questions in poland and 
the Baltic states about how Germany would respond political-
ly and militarily if russia were to undertake more aggressive 
action. Despite	assurances	that	Germany	will	show	solidarity	and	
act	according	to	Article	5,	its	actual	reaction	is	difficult	to	predict,	
and	may	depend	 on	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 determined	by	 internal	
German	 politics	 (e.g.	 approaching	 state	 or	 federal	 elections,	 the	
composition	of	the	ruling	coalition,	and	the	mindset	of	the	German	
decision-makers),	 the	 regional	 situation	 (reaction	 to	 Russian	 ac-
tions	by	NATO’s	eastern	members),	and	by	Russia	itself	(the	degree	
of	 success	 of	 Russian	 disinformation	 campaigns	 in	 Germany).26	
however, the very fact that the allies in the Baltic sea region 
and central eastern europe are having doubts about the pos-
sible German reaction in times of conflict is undermining the 
sense of security on nato’s eastern flank. 
(2) closer military co-operation in the region? In	view	of	a	clos-
er	 French-British	 military	 co-operation,	 Germany has been 
seeking to develop military co-operation with the smaller 
26	 Anton	Trojanovski,	 ‘Kreml	startet	Propaganda-Offensive	 in	Deutschland’,	
















and medium-sized allies and partners, also from the Baltic 






pabilities.	NATO’s	 eastern	members	 are	 thus	 facing	 a	dilemma.	








investing	 in	 military	 co-operation	 with	 Berlin	 and	 becoming	
militarily	dependent	on	it,	when	it	is	unclear	whether	Germany	
can	be	 relied	on	politically	and	militarily	 in	 conflict	 situations?	
the uncertainty about Germany’s reaction in the event of 
a crisis or conflict in the region has contributed to the am-
bivalent attitudes of the smaller and medium-sized part-
ners towards developing far-reaching military-technical 







case	 of	 navies)	 or	 creating	 joint	 units	 and	 command	 structures	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 bilateral	 or	 multilateral	 co-operation	
outside	NATO.	
Justyna GotKoWsKa
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